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HAVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN ASIA BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE 




There is a broad consensus that the soft US dollar pegs operated by a number of Asian 
countries prior to 1997 contributed to the regional financial crisis of 1997-98. There is, 
however, much less agreement on the types of exchange rate regimes operated by many 
Asian countries since the crisis. Can they still be characterized as soft US dollar pegs, 
or have they become genuinely more flexible? This paper revisits the evidence 
regarding the extent of exchange rate flexibility in the five Asian countries (Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) post crisis using alternative 
methodologies and data up to mid 2004. Using alternative methodologies is critical as 
different measures or parameters could lead to diametrically opposite conclusions 
regarding the type of exchange rate regime operated by a country.  
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1.   Introduction 
There is a broad consensus that the soft US dollar pegs operated by a number of 
Asian countries prior to 1997 contributed to the regional financial crisis of 1997-98. 
There is, however, much less agreement on the types of exchange rate regimes operated 
by many Asian countries since the crisis. To be sure, among the crisis-hit countries, the 
Malaysian ringgit has been unambiguously fixed to the US dollar (at 3.80 Malaysian 
Ringgit per US dollar) since September 1998. In contrast, the four other crisis-hit 
countries, viz. Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, officially proclaimed to 
have floated their exchange rates while adopting a monetary policy strategy based on 
inflation targeting (see Table 1 and Cavoli and Rajan, 2005).  
There is a burgeoning literature documenting that there can be a significant 
divergence between de facto and de jure exchange rate policies and regimes. Just how 
flexible have exchange rates in Asia become post crisis? Can they still be characterized 
as soft US dollar pegs as suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Fukuda (2002) and 
McKinnon (2001), or have they become genuinely more flexible as suggested by Baig 
(2001), Hernández and Montiel (2001), Kawai (2002), and others
1.  
At a first glance, Figure 1 reveals that exchange rates do indeed appear to have 
become more flexible in recent years for all the countries except Malaysia. Even if the 
Asian currencies have become more flexible, what form has the flexibility taken, i.e. 
free floating, managed floating, basket pegging, etc? The extent and form of flexibility 
of Asian currencies post crisis is not solely of academic interest, being directly related 
                                                 
1 Of course, apart from differences in methodologies and estimating techniques, divergences in 






to the ongoing debate on the need for global macroeconomic adjustments and the 
manner in which such adjustments are to be attained (Rajan, 2004, 2005).  
This paper revisits the evidence regarding the extent of exchange rate flexibility 
in the five Asian countries post crisis using alternative methodologies and data up to 
mid 2004. Using assorted methodologies is critical as different measures or parameters 
could lead to diametrically opposite conclusions regarding the type of exchange rate 
regime operated by a country. 
An important caveat is in order before proceeding. There are a number of recent 
papers on the topic of de facto regime classification -- for instance, see Bénassy-Quéré 
et al. (2004), Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002, 2003), Frankel et al. (2001), Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002), Kim (2003), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002), Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2002) and Shambaugh (2004). This paper does not concern itself with actually 
classifying exchange rate regimes, but instead concentrates on detecting possible 
regime changes in the five Asian countries pre and post crisis.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the de 
facto regimes by investigating the unconditional volatilities of exchange rates, interest 
rates and international reserves using monthly data for the period 1990 to 2004. It also 
conducts more formal tests to ascertain the degree of exchange rate flexibility and the 
extent of intervention employed to control the volatility of the currency for the period 
January 1990 to June 2004. The focus is on the difference in the variability of exchange 
rates, interest rates and international reserves in each Asian country pre and post crisis, 
as well as between the Asian countries and noted ‘floaters’ (Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, UK and USA) post crisis
2. Section 3 computes a set of exchange market 
                                                 
2 The monthly data are from the IMF-IFS CD and from the ADB-ARIC database from January 




pressure (EMP) indices to provide a summary measure of the degree of flexibility (or 
inversely, the degree of intervention). Section 4 presents more formal tests on the extent 
to which each of the currencies examined have been pegged to the US dollar and to the 
Japanese yen using variations of the methodology pioneered by Frankel and Wei 
(1994). Section 5 offers a summary and some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Pre and Post Crisis Behaviour of Exchange Rates, Interest Rates and 
Reserves 
 
We attempt to do two things in this section. One, we investigate the behaviour 
of exchange rates, interest rates and reserves for the crisis-affected countries using 
monthly data for the period 1990 to 2004. The nexus between the volatilities of 
exchange rates, interest rates and reserves is important from a policy perspective in that 
it offers insight into whether central banks used interest rates or reserves to manage 
currency movements. Two, in order to assist with the comparison, we split the sample 
into the pre crisis and post crisis sub-samples. The volatilities of exchange rates, 
interest rates and reserves for the pre and post crisis samples are compared for each 
country and between the crisis-hit countries and the known ‘floaters’ of Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, UK and USA (as defined by Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).  
 
2.1  Standard Deviations of Exchange Rates, Interest Rates and Reserves 
  Figures 2a to 2c present annual (calendar year) standard deviations of monthly 
percentage changes in exchange rates for the crisis-affected countries
3.  
                                                                                                                                              
per yen are calculated from the US/yen rate, and real effective exchange rate (REERs) are 
from the ADB-ARIC database. Reserves data are taken from lines 11, 14 and 16c of IFS, and 
interest rates are taken from line 60B of IFS. 
 




  The extreme volatility of the exchange rates during the crisis of 1997-98 
notwithstanding, the exchange rate volatilities in Korea, Thailand and Indonesia are 
significantly higher in the post crisis period, while there is no volatility of the ringgit 
against the US dollar, as would be expected (Figure 1). The differences in variability for 
the Philippines seem economically insignificant when eyeballing the data. Exchange 
rate volatility of the regional currencies against the yen does not appear to have 
increased discernibly pre and post crisis, except possibly for Indonesia (Figure 2b). The 
results for the real effective exchange rates (REERs) show similar but not as marked 
differences between the two periods compared to the volatilities of local currencies per 
US dollars (Figure 2c). Overall, the exchange rate volatilities offer some indicative 
initial evidence to support the claim that exchange rate regimes in Korea, the 
Philippines and Thailand have become more flexible post crisis.    
It well known that unconditional exchange rate volatility alone cannot 
adequately describe the currency regime adopted by a country. This is because central 
banks could use interest rates and reserves as policy instruments to help actively 
manage or influence currency movements. Accordingly, in order to present a more 
complete account of the possible change of regime (i.e. degree of conditional exchange 
rate flexibility), the volatilities of interest rates and reserves must also be taken into 
account. Specifically, a regime considered to be less flexible will have relatively low 
exchange rate volatility, ceteris paribus
4. If, in the event of relatively low exchange rate 
                                                 
4 The ceteris paribus condition is, of course, critical as the implicit assumption is that there is 
no substantive change in the external environment. In order for a full analysis to be undertaken 
we would need to estimate a monetary model or a related model that is able to capture the 
external factors that might have an impact on the exchange rate. The problems with 
fundamentals-based models of exchange rates are well known and do not need to be repeated 
here. Also see Willett (2004) for a useful discussion of the issue of trends versus volatilities 





volatility and where reserve volatility is high but interest rate volatility is low, then it 
might be posited that reserves are the primary policy instrument (i.e. exchange rate 
intervention). If reserve volatility is low but interest rate volatility is high, then 
plausibly, interest rates might be the primary instrument for stabilizing the currency 
(Reinhart, 2000)
5.  
Figure 3 examines the money market interest rates in annual standard deviation 
of monthly first differences. As is apparent, interest rates are clearly less volatile after 
the crisis, particularly for Korea, Thailand and the Philippines
6. 
    Figure 4 shows the annual standard deviations of monthly percentage 
differences in foreign reserves scaled by lagged base money. First differences of 
reserves are taken rather than actual levels to account for possible unit root in reserves 
data. Specifically, we know that Korea and other Asian countries (except the 
Philippines) have been accumulating reserves since 1998, a reflection of the fact that 
the currencies have been undervalued (Kim et al., 2004 and Hernández and Montiel, 
2001). However, we are interested here in the management of volatility as opposed to 
management of the value of the exchange rate. In addition, reserves are scaled by 
lagged domestic monetary base in order to compare the magnitude of the reserve 
change in relation to the stock of money base in the system. Since reserves are used to 
alter relative monies, scaling the change in reserves offers some information about the 
proportion of the money base that is being used for intervention. The differences in 
reserve volatility between the pre and post crisis periods are not easily detectable for 
                                                 
5 We are abstracting here from issues relating to sterilization of reserve intervention. 
 
6 Money market rates (IFS line 60B) are used as they appear to adequately represent the policy 




most countries. Korea is a notable exception where it seems that reserves volatility has 
increased significantly post crisis (also see Willett, 2004). 
  Comparing Figures 2a and 2c, it can be seen, at least for the local currency per 
US dollar and the REERs, that exchange rate volatility is higher post crisis, and that 
interest rates have become less volatile. The implication regarding the volatility of 
reserves is harder to categorically determine. The conclusion is that the exchange rate 
regimes for Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines have become more flexible 
post crisis. The reverse is true for Malaysia. However, this conclusion is clouded 
somewhat by the volatility of reserves, where there is little evidence to support a 
conclusion of increased flexibility. In fact, Korea seems to be using reserves more 
aggressively after the crisis than before, while the volatility of international reserves 
does not appear to have materially decreased post crisis for Thailand and the 
Philippines. 
 
2.2  Pre versus Post crisis Volatilities and Comparison with Known Floaters       
  Table 2 presents the standard deviations of exchange rates, interest rates and 
reserve changes as before for the five Asian countries and for the known floaters for the 
pre and post crisis sample periods. We define the pre crisis sample as spanning the 
period 1990:1 to 1997:3, while the post crisis sample period is 1999:6 to 2004:6
7. We 
aim to do two things here. First, we compare the relative volatilities in a single country 
                                                 
7 Thus, we define the crisis period as being between 1997:4 and 1999:5. There is, admittedly, a 
degree of ad-hocism in the choice of these periods. For instance, Hernández and Montiel 
(2001) Taguchi (2004) take the post crisis period to be 1991:1. Our choice of 1999:5 as being 
the end of the crisis is derived from simple robustness tests -- we found that, by and large, the 
post crisis results were reasonably robust as we kept working backwards from the end of the 
sample and expanding the sample size until 1999:6, beyond which the results began to change 





over the two sample periods. Second, we compare the post crisis samples of the five 
Asian countries with the known floaters. 
A comparison of each sample confirms the conclusions of the previous section. 
Irrespective of how the exchange rate is expressed (i.e. vis-à-vis the US dollar, yen or 
REER), its volatility after the crisis increased for Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, 
decreased for Malaysia, and remained more-or-less stable (with a bias to a slight 
decrease) in the Philippines. Correspondingly, interest rate and reserve volatility 
decreased after the crisis for the most part, although there are a few important 
exceptions. The first relates to interest rates in Indonesia. Unlike in the other countries, 
they have become more variable after the crisis. Along with a post crisis reduction in 
reserve volatility, this suggests that interest rates are possibly used more frequently as a 
policy instrument
8. The second exception is the increase in reserve volatility in Korea. 
Is this an indication of some desire to continue to use reserves as an exchange rate 
management tool?  
  As in Baig (2001) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and others, we compare the 
post crisis volatilities for the Asian countries and the known floaters. For the most part 
the exchange rate variation is lower for those countries in the Asian sample than for the 
floaters. The interest rate volatility in the floaters is also lower, suggesting that they are 
less inclined to intervene using interest rate policy. (Interest rate smoothing appears to 
be a more important objective among industrial countries). With regard to the volatility 
                                                 
8 Of course, it could also be that the market risk element of interest rates (i.e. risk premium) 





of reserves, it appears that New Zealand is an outlier here, and that the floaters possess 
less variation in reserves
9.  
Thus, the simple analysis undertaken thus far leads to the conclusion that, with 
the exception of Malaysia, the Asian countries have moved towards more flexible 
exchange rates. However, the Asian currencies are clearly far less flexible than the 
known floaters, suggesting some degree of continued market intervention to stabilize 
the exchange rate
10. Results of this nature have led many to hypothesize about a 
possible “Fear of Floating” in some emerging market economies (for instance, see Baig, 
2001 and Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
 
3.  Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) Indices  
3.1  Defining the Indices 
  As discussed, it is important to simultaneously consider the three variables (viz. 
exchange rates, interest rates and reserve changes) to obtain a proper perspective on the 
extent of exchange rate flexibility (or conversely, the extent of intervention). One way 
of incorporating all these variables would be to compute an exchange rate pressure 
(EMP) index. This section presents two sets of simple EMP indices based on Baig 
(2001), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998), Glick and Wihlborg (1997) and Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002): 
 
                                                 
9 New Zealand is an interesting case is that it has not chosen to hold its own reserves, the bulk 
of its reserves having been borrowed. However, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) 
has recently taken steps to bolster its capacity to intervene in the foreign exchange market to 
influence the level of the New Zealand dollar in certain circumstances. 
 
10 Of course, it could also be that the floaters are faced with a different set of shocks to the 






Index 1 = σ ER/(σ ER+σ NFA)         (1)  
Index 2 = σ ER/(σ ER+σ NFA+ σ IR)         ( 2 )  
 
where σ ER is the annual standard deviation of monthly (log) percentage difference in the 
exchange rate, σ IR is the annual standard deviation of monthly first differences in 
money market rates, and σ NFA is the annual standard deviation of monthly percentage 
difference in reserves (Net Foreign Assets/Lagged Money Base). All standard 
deviations are calculated as in the previous sections.     
  While there are a number of different types of EMP indices (for instance, see 
Guimãeres and Karacadag, 2004), the particular set of indices were chosen because they 
are easily aligned with the discussion of the previous section about the role of interest 
rates and/or reserves as policy instruments. For instance, a low index value in this 
instance may imply less exchange rate flexibility or a higher level of intervention. Other 
things being equal, higher reserve volatility will reduce the index value, possibly 
suggesting that reserves are being employed as a monetary policy tool in order to limit 
exchange rate flexibility. 
  Index 1 measures the possible effects of reserve intervention but ignores the 
effects of interest rates. Baig (2001) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) are primarily 
concerned with this type of index as interest rate movements contain market as well as 
policy determinants
11. While this is true, the same can be said of reserves data – which 
                                                 
11 Willett (2004) uses a measure referred to as the “intervention index”, which is merely 1- 





are not cleansed of currency valuation changes
12. It may be worth evaluating the effects 
of interest rate based intervention in light of the move by some Asian central banks 
towards inflation targeting and the use of interest rate rules (Cavoli and Rajan, 2005). 
Hence, Index 2 is a generalized index capturing both reserve and interest rate 
intervention. By construction, each index presents values bounded by 0 and 1, and the 
weights attributable to each variable in the denominator of the index are equal.
13  
 
3.1  Interpreting the Results 
As in the previous section, three measures of the exchange rate are used, viz. 
local against the US dollar, the yen, and the REER. The results are presented in Figures 
5 and 6. Figures 5a to 5c show Index 1 for the US dollar, yen and REER, respectively. 
Figures 6a to 6c show Index 2 for the US dollar, yen and REER, respectively  
Focussing on Index 1, an examination of Figures 5a to 5c tends to confirm that, 
pre-crisis, there was a greater inclination on the part of central banks to intervene in the 
market against the US dollar, most so in the case of Indonesia and Thailand. Both these 
countries appear to have become fairly flexible post crisis as evidenced by the rise in 
their respective EMPs, especially vis-à-vis the US dollar. Less obvious results are 
obtained in the case of the Philippines, while the Malaysian ringgit has become 
completely inflexible vis-à-vis the US dollar. Somewhat surprisingly, after a period of 
                                                 
12 Cleansing the data to focus only on reserves change due to policy intervention rather than 
valuation changes is not possible as most countries do not provide data on the currency 
composition of reserves. 
 
13 The calculation of weights in indices of this type is a critical feature of the literature on 
EMP. In some cases theory is used as the basis for determining the weights (for instance, see 
Girton and Roper, 1977), while in other cases, empirical methods are employed to select the 




flirting with floatation, the Korean won appears to be becoming less flexible against the 
US dollar.  
Looking at the local currency per yen, pre crisis the regional currencies appeared 
to have been fairly flexible vis-à-vis the yen. This suggests that local central banks 
allowed their currencies values relative to the yen to be determined by the yen/US rate, 
so–called “third currency phenomenon”. Thus, prior to 1997, if regional countries had 
given greater weight to the yen in their baskets pre crisis, there would have been lower 
degrees of regional real exchange rate overvaluations following the nearly 50 percent 
nominal appreciation of the US dollar relative to the yen between June 1995 to April 
1997 (which in turn led to a rise in the value of the regional currencies relative to the 
yen) (Bird and Rajan, 2002 and Rajan, 2002). Post crisis, while there does not appear to 
be any discernible change in the degree of flexibility of the Indonesian rupiah, the 
Philippine peso, and the Malaysia ringgit vis-à-vis the yen post crisis, the Korean won 
has become relatively less flexible vis-à-vis the yen post crisis
14, while the Thai baht 
has become more so.  
Based on the foregoing analysis, as would be expected, while the Thai baht has 
become more flexible in REER terms, the won seems to have become less so. Indeed, 
comparing Figures 5a, 5b and 5c, it is apparent that while the EMP of the Korean won 
vis-à-vis the US dollar was lower than the yen or the REER pre crisis, post crisis its 
EMP vis-à-vis the REER was lower than the other two. This suggests that while the 
won may have been heavily managed relative to the US dollar prior to the crisis, there 
is some evidence to suggest it has become more managed relative to a basket (involving 
the yen and US dollar), such that the won’s REER is relatively stable.  
                                                 
14 Oh (2004) also finds that the Korean won has displayed increasing co-movements with the 




  How robust are these results? If one examines Figures 6a to 6c (using Index 2), 
we reach the same conclusion that the regional currencies with the exception of the 
Malaysian ringgit have become more flexible vis-à-vis the US dollar post crisis. As 
discussed above, the Korean won appears to be reverting to a soft dollar peg. 
Interestingly, however, the further conclusion that the won may be more heavily pegged 
to the REER than the US dollar post crisis no longer holds. The reason for this is the 
rise in the Korean won’s EMP post crisis relative to the yen compared to the previous 
conclusion of a decline (compare Figure 5b and 6b). However, the finding that the Thai 
baht has become relatively more flexible in general (relative to the US dollar, the yen 
and in REER terms) continues to hold.  
         
4.  Extent of Influence of the US Dollar and the Yen in Asian Currencies 
 
  One of the main results from the previous two sections is that the extent of 
intervention in the US dollar has decreased for the most part, but there appears to be a 
reversion to a US dollar peg in some instances, particularly in the case of Korea. 
However, there is some degree of uncertainty as to whether the Korean won is 
following (pegged to?) the yen more closely post crisis. This section presents two sets 
of formal tests (OLS and Kalman Filter based estimates) to ascertain the degree to 
which local currencies have been and continue to be influenced by the US dollar and by 
the yen  
 
4.1  Simple OLS Regressions 





The first set of tests is based on the well-known work by Frankel and Wei 
(1994). The method essentially involves conducting an OLS test of the local currency 
on other currencies that are considered to influence the former. Each currency is 
expressed in terms of an ‘independent’ numeraire. The equation examined is as follows: 
 
LCt = β0 + β1USt + β2JPt + ￿t      ( 3 )  
 
where LC refers to the local currency. All currencies are expressed in log differences 
and the numeraire currency used is the Swiss franc. As with the empirical results in the 
previous section, the pre crisis sample is 1990:1 to 1997:3 and the post crisis sample is 
1999:6 to 2004:6. 
  Table 3 presents the pre and post crisis values of β1 and β2 for Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines
15. Only the pre crisis regressions are presented for 
Malaysia given the country’s stated post crisis rigid fix to the US dollar. The coefficient 
values are interpreted as the degree of influence of the US dollar and yen, respectively, 
on the local currency. A larger β value is suggestive of a high degree of influence of the 
US dollar, and hence possible intervention in the market for that currency. This said, it 
is important to note that a large positive and significant coefficient on  β1 does 
necessarily imply strong US dollar pegs. As Hernández and Montiel (2001) note 
“(such) results are consistent either with a tight peg against the U.S. dollar…or with a 
much looser currency link to the dollar combined with tight economic links to the dollar 
area and a relative absence of independent shocks during the sample period”. 
                                                 
15 When interpreting the significance levels of the coefficient estimates it is important to be 





The results based on the simple OLS in Table 3 reveal that the value of β1 has 
fallen after the crisis. By and large, this validates the results from the previous sections 
in that the degree of flexibility against the US dollar has increased after the crisis. Not 
only has the value fallen, but the level of significance has declined as well, possibly an 
indication of a reduction in the tightness of the peg to the US dollar. Also noteworthy is 
the increase in the degree of influence of the yen after the crisis. This is noticeable 
across-the-board. It should be noted though that the significance levels are lower for the 
yen than for the US dollar. This is broadly consistent with the results in Section 3, 
whereby the EMPs of the currencies using the US dollar have generally risen post crisis 
and have fallen relative to the yen, but the former still exceeds the latter. 
 
4.2  Kalman Filter Estimations 
The relative degree of significance between the US dollar and the yen can be 
explored further by applying the Kalman Filter to the regressions
16. Such regressions 
allow for the coefficient’s evolution to be tracked over the entire sample. The model 
used is as follows: 
     
LCt = β0 + β1tUSt + β2tJPt + ￿t       ( 3 )  
β1t = β1t-1 + ε1t             ( 4 )  
β2t = β2t-1 + ε 2t             ( 5 )  
 
Equation (3) once again describes the measurement equation of the system, but each 
coefficient is assumed to vary over time, the evolution of which is given by Equations 
                                                 





(4) and (5). This particular simple version of the Kalman Filter method applies a 
recursive algorithm to estimate the value of each β at each iteration. The result is that 
the evolution of each β can be examined for the pre crisis and post crisis periods 
without the need to split the sample
17.  
One of the advantages of the Kalman Filter technique over the simple Frankel-
Wei OLS tests is that the volatility of a coefficient can be observed over time. This may 
offer us greater insight into central bank behaviour. A smooth time path of the 
coefficient might imply that the central bank intervenes to maintain the influence of one 
currency over the other. A high but erratic coefficient value possibly implies a strong 
correlation that is not necessarily brought about by central bank behaviour. Rather, it 
could imply a strong correlation that occurs naturally in the market for that particular 
currency pair, driven by market conditions, trader behaviour or noise.   
  Figure 6 shows the one-step ahead forecasts of β1 and β2 (for the US dollar and 
the yen) at each iteration over the sample period 1990:1 to 2004:6 for the five Asian 
countries. As with the EMP indices, the crisis period is easy to detect for both the US 
dollar and the yen. The results lend weight to those of the previous section in that the 
won, baht, and rupiah are all seemingly less influenced by the US dollar after the crisis. 
For Korea and Thailand, the value of β 1 is more volatile post crisis. Volatility of the 
coefficient values over time might possibly be interpreted as a loosening of the degree 
of influence of a particular currency over the local currency -- perhaps a reflection of a 
loosening of a peg to that currency. This is consistent with Kim and Lee (2004) who 
                                                                                                                                              
 
17 The βs are assumed to follow a random walk and the covariance matrix of the measurement 
and the transition equation is diagonal. This is the usual practise (see Cuthbertson et al., 1992 




find that Thai and Korean interest rates have become less sensitive to US interest rates 
post crisis, suggesting greater flexibility of these currencies relative to the US dollar. 
As expected, the β 1 coefficient for Malaysia is 1 after the crisis. Interestingly, 
the influence of the yen (β 2) is more volatile after the crisis for Thailand and higher in 
value for Korea and Indonesia, but also more volatile, especially for Korea. The results 
for the Philippines accord to those in the last section. There appears to be little 
difference in the influence of the US dollar or the yen between the pre and post crisis 
periods.    
Figure 7 presents the time variation of β1 and β2 on the same graph for each 
country. It can be seen here that, in general, the influence of the US dollar has decreased 
after the crisis, but that the influence of the yen has increased. For Korea, there is a 
sizeable difference between the influence of the dollar and that of the yen before the 
crisis. After the crisis, there is evidence of convergence, as the coefficient for β 1 has 
decreased and β 2 increased. This is consistent with the conclusions drawn based on the 
EMP using Index 1, but not Index 2. The extent to which the baht is driven by the dollar 
is more erratic post crisis and is matched by the yen. This is in line with the conclusions 
in the previous section which suggest that the baht may have become more flexible vis-
à-vis both the yen and the US dollar post crisis. Indonesia’s coefficient for the US 
dollar is relatively smooth compared to the yen, suggesting a possible inclination to 
continue to fix to the US dollar. The comparative results for the Philippines show that 
while the degree of influence of the US dollar may be high, it is not smooth. This is 
representative of a scenario where a high correlation does not necessarily imply a peg. 




results for Malaysia are as expected, the ringgit being influenced entirely by the US 
dollar post crisis. 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
  This paper has reviewed the pre and post crisis exchange rate regimes for Korea, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. The de jure regimes for Korea, 
Thailand and Indonesia seem to suggest that exchange rates underwent a transition from 
soft US dollar pegs to floating exchange rates (cum inflation targeting) after the crisis.  
Malaysia’s regime reverted to a fully fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar since 
September 1998. The Philippines, which was least impacted by the crisis, maintained 
its status as operating a ‘dirty’ floating exchange rate regime.  
  We return to our basic question posed in the Introduction -- Have the Asian 
countries (except Malaysia) moved to more flexible exchange rate regimes, or have 
they reverted to soft US dollar pegs post crisis? From the various measures of de facto 
regimes presented in this paper, it appears that there is definitely an increase in 
exchange rate flexibility after the crisis in the case of Thailand. There is some evidence 
of a possible reversion to a US dollar peg for Indonesia (also see Siregar and Rajan, 
2003). The results for Korea are arguably most interesting in that they suggest that 
while there is still a significant and possibly increasing degree of influence by the US 
dollar on local currencies after the crisis, the influence of the yen has increased 
materially post crisis. However, the variability of this influence has also increased. As 
such, it is unclear whether the Korean monetary authorities are consciously placing 




they have genuinely let the currency float and the market has caused a higher co-
movement between local currencies and the yen. This is an area for future research
18.  
Going forward, in a world of generalized flexible exchange rates among the 
major currencies, there may be a case for Asian currencies to consider pegging to a 
basket of currencies (Bird and Rajan, 2002 and Rajan, 2002). By managing exchange 
rate changes against a composite bundle of currencies (that is, stabilizing the ‘effective’ 
exchange rate), countries may be able to buffer themselves against outside exchange 
rate shocks (such as G-3 currency variations) and neutralize this source of instability. 
Such a ‘band-basket-crawl’ or BBC arrangement may not only be an attractive regime 
for countries that have embraced more flexibility post crisis like Korea and Thailand, 
but also US dollar 'fixers' in Asia like China, Hong Kong and Malaysia
19. Indonesia, 
which appears to have had difficulties with implementing an inflation targeting regime 
and may be reverting to a soft dollar peg, could also consider such a regime. While such 
an arrangement is no panacea against unsustainable macroeconomic policies and 
extreme external shocks, it may be a way of trading off the disciplinary and credibility 
benefits of a pegged regime with the flexibility of a floating one.  
                                                 
18 Eichengreen (2004) and Willett (2004) explore Korean exchange rate and monetary policies 
in some detail. However, neither specifically addresses or entangles the issue of the won-yen 
nexus. Also see Oh (2004). 
  
19 India and Singapore are two Asian countries that currently operate slightly different versions 
of the BBC. For discussions of the Singapore experience with managed floating, see Rajan and 
Siregar (2002) and Hoe Ee et al. (2004). For a discussion of Indian exchange rate policy, see 
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Highlights of Inflation Targeting Regimes in Selected Asian Countries 
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  Pre Post Pre  Post Pre  Post  Pre  Post Pre Post 
Indonesia 0.24  6.09  2.87  6.42  1.57  4.88  1.97  2.67 9.72 7.93 
Korea 0.79  2.29  2.69  2.89  1.15  1.48  1.28  0.10 3.25  13.33 
Philippines 2.24 2.17  3.82  3.11  2.33  2.05  5.68  0.60 6.43 5.70 
Thailand 0.50  2.11  2.57  3.01  1.08  1.37  2.26  0.25 4.55 3.59 
Average  0.94 3.17 2.99  3.86 1.53  2.45  2.80  0.91 5.99 7.64 
                
Malaysia 1.25  --  2.80  2.45  1.58  1.46  0.41  0.06  9.59  8.77 
                    
Australia 2.06  3.25  3.67  3.63  2.10  2.08  0.32  0.15  3.58  7.35 
Canada 1.22  1.91  2.85  4.09  1.25  1.39  0.56  0.21  4.34  3.07 
New Zealand  1.57  3.55  3.20  2.94  1.43  2.15  0.71  0.16 29.62  22.53 
UK 3.25  2.29  3.87  2.86  1.76  1.22  0.64  0.82  6.73  0.54 
USA --  --  2.87  2.45  1.64  1.78  0.18  0.21  3.92  0.23 
Average  2.03 2.75 3.29  3.19 1.64  1.73  0.48  0.31 9.64 6.74 
 
Source: IMF IFS and ADB-ARIC data, monthly observations. 
Notes:  Standard deviations are calculated from percentage first differences (Exchange rates, 
and reserves/lagged money base), first differences (Interest rates).   
Pre sample period: 1990:1 to 1997:3 











OLS Estimates using Frankel and Wei (1994) Method 
 
Equation: LCt = β0 + β1USt + β2JPt + ￿t   
 
 Korea  Thailand  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines 
  Pre  Post Pre  Post Pre  Post Pre  Pre  Post 










































































adj  0.97  0.72 0.99  0.60 0.99  0.31 0.89  0.75  0.54 
DW  1.92  1.74 2.06  1.98 1.97  2.01 1.80  1.92  2.20 
Obs  87  61 87  61 97  61 87  87  61 
 
Notes: *(**)(†), 10% (5%)(1%) significant levels, respectively 
Malaysia post crisis regressions not included.  
Korea pre crisis results, Indonesia pre and post crisis results contained serial 
correlation. To correct for this, Korea pre crisis and Indonesia post crisis model 







Figure 1: Exchange Rates, 1990-2004 
   Source: IMF IFS and ADB-ARIC. 
 
 
















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2a: Standard Deviations of Local Exchange Rate Per US Dollar 
Source: IMF IFS. Calculated as calendar year standard deviations of percentage first differences 



















































































Figure 2b: Standard Deviations, Local Exchange Rate Per Yen 


















































































Figure 2c: Standard Deviations of REER 
 




















































































Figure 3: Standard Deviations of Interest Rates 















































































Figure 4: Standard Deviations of Reserves (as a Ratio of Lagged Money Base) 
Source: IMF IFS. Calculated as annual standard deviation of percentage monthly first 














































































Figure 5a: Flexibility Index 1 
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Figure 6a: Flexibility Index 2 
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